Can Police Get My 23andMe or AncestryDNA Raw Data and Does a Downloaded File Change That
Police can ask 23andMe or AncestryDNA for data only through legal process. A raw file you never uploaded is in no database they can search, but the company's copy stays.
Yes, with a warrant or court order, but 23andMe and AncestryDNA do not let police search their matching databases. Both companies say they require valid legal process before handing anything over. The databases police have actually searched are relative-matching sites where people uploaded raw files. A raw file you downloaded and never uploaded anywhere is in no database anyone can query, though downloading it does not remove the copy the company already holds.
This post describes the US picture. In the EU and UK, police access to data runs through different legal process, and GDPR deletion rights apply.
Can police access my 23andMe or AncestryDNA raw data?
There are two different questions hiding in that one. The first is whether police can compel a company to hand over what it holds on you. In principle yes, with a warrant, subpoena or court order, and the company decides how hard to resist. Both 23andMe and AncestryDNA publish transparency reports listing the requests they received and how many they answered. Check the latest ones for the current numbers, because policies and owners change. In 2025, after 23andMe's Chapter 11, its data moved to TTAM Research Institute, which committed to honour 23andMe's existing privacy policy.
The second question is whether police can search a database without asking you or the testing company at all. That is how the Golden State Killer case was solved in 2018: investigators uploaded a profile built from crime-scene DNA to GEDmatch, a site where hobbyists put raw files from other companies, and found relatives. No company was compelled to do anything.
How a genealogy search actually works
A raw file is a list of about 600,000 to 700,000 positions in your genome, called SNPs. Investigators build a similar list from the evidence sample, then ask a matching database which uploaded people share long stretches of DNA with it. A third cousin shares very little, but enough to be detected. The match is a relative, not the suspect. Genealogists then build family trees until one person fits the time, place and age. The last step is to confirm the lead by collecting that person's DNA directly and running a standard forensic comparison. The genealogy match points investigators somewhere; it is not what proves identity.
This is why coverage matters more than your own choices. A 2018 paper by Erlich et al. in Science estimated that a database covering about 2% of a target population would give nearly everyone a third-cousin-or-closer match, and that about 60% of Americans of European descent were already findable at the time. Nobody needs the whole population to have uploaded. That is why your cousins' uploads can expose you even if you never uploaded anything yourself.
Three places your DNA can sit
Held by the testing company. Your sample result sits on their servers. Access depends on their policy and on legal process. Deleting your account usually removes the data from active use, but 23andMe states that it keeps some genetic and account data after deletion to meet its lab (CLIA) obligations. Ask any company what it must keep and what happens to backups.
Uploaded to a matching database. This is the one that matters most. If the site allows law-enforcement searches, your file is searchable by design. FamilyTreeDNA allowed FBI access and offers an opt-out toggle. MyHeritage bans law-enforcement matching outright. GEDmatch has been opt-in since 2019, but that same year a Florida judge granted a warrant to search all of GEDmatch, users who had not opted in included. A site setting is a policy, and a warrant can override it. Policies differ by site and have changed more than once.
Read only on your own device. Nothing leaves it, so there is nothing to search or subpoena at a third party.
| Reachable by legal process | Searchable by police without a request | |
|---|---|---|
| Held by testing company | Yes | No, by stated policy |
| Uploaded to a relative-matching site | Yes | Depends on the site's opt-in or opt-out, and a warrant can override it |
| File only read in the browser, never uploaded | Only via your own device or cloud account | No |
| Copy held by HealthOSX (ancestry markers or stored file, only with consent) | Yes, until you delete it | No, there is no relative-matching database |
| Ask your DNA summary and conversations held by HealthOSX (saved against your email) | Yes | No, there is no relative-matching database |
Scroll the table sideways for the rest →
General picture only. Each company's policy differs and changes, so check the current one.
Does a downloaded file change that?
Half of it. The download is a copy. The company's copy is untouched, so the company-held exposure stays exactly as it was until you delete the account. What the download changes is where new copies go. A file in your Downloads folder is in no relative-matching database unless you put it there.
Two limits. A file on a laptop or in a synced cloud folder can be reached the way any personal document can, through a device search or a request to the cloud provider. And your relatives are a separate matter: if a cousin uploaded theirs to a database that allows police searches, you can be found through them, whatever you did with your file. You cannot fully opt out of what your family does. That part is not settled by any setting.
What to do now
- GEDmatch: it has been opt-in since 2019, so check that you have not opted in to police matching, or delete your kit.
- FamilyTreeDNA: this is the one with an opt-out toggle, so open your privacy settings and switch law-enforcement matching off.
- MyHeritage: it bans law-enforcement matching outright and has no opt-out setting, so there is nothing to switch. If you do not want your file there, delete it.
- 23andMe and Ancestry: delete your account and ask for your saliva sample to be destroyed. Expect some data to remain; 23andMe states it keeps some genetic and account data for CLIA obligations.
- Keep the downloaded file out of synced cloud folders, or encrypt it.
Questions to ask any DNA company
- What is your law enforcement policy, and does it require a warrant or just a subpoena?
- Is law-enforcement matching opt-in, opt-out, or not offered at all?
- Do you publish a transparency report, and how many requests did you receive and answer last year?
- If I delete my account, what is actually deleted, what is kept, and how long are backups held?
- What happens to my data if the company is sold or goes bankrupt?
- Is my sample stored after testing, and can I have it destroyed?
A company that answers these plainly is behaving differently from one that points you to a general privacy page.
What about reading the file without uploading it
A search needs a database holding your genotype. HealthOSX has no relative-matching database, but it can still hold copies of your data, and you should know when. There are three server-side copies. If you consent to the ancestry analysis, the genetic markers it needs are held on HealthOSX servers until you delete them. If you choose to store the whole file, it sits encrypted in your account. And Ask your DNA sends a summary of your results to the server and saves your conversations against your email. Any of these copies can be reached by legal process like any company-held data. None is searchable by police the way a matching site is.

The download steps for 23andMe, on the page itself.

Ancestry across 15 regions and 157 reference populations.
The free reader at healthosx.com/dna accepts a raw 23andMe, AncestryDNA, MyHeritage or whole-genome VCF file. The trait and health story appears with nothing asked, and the full report opens in the web app after an email code. Ancestry and file storage create a copy on our servers only with your consent, and Ask your DNA creates the summary and conversation copy described above.
New to raw DNA files? Start with the full guide: 23andMe Raw Data Interpretation Free in Your Browser
Written by
HealthOSX Research